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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops deterministic and stochastic models
for comparison of attrition and promotion rates for senior
Naval Officers. The deterministic models show a feasible
region for promotion and attrition rates. The stochastic
models show the probability distribution of inputs into the
grade and retirements from the grade which result from a
promotion system based on a minimum time in rank and a
promotion system where the number of promotions are determined
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The officer personnel system currently in existence in
the Navy is an outgrowth of many years of development,
legislative action and service policy. When viewed as a
system the management of officer personnel in the Navy is
subject to numerous constraints at various levels such as
overall size and budget, while at the same time it has no
mathematical objective function. The general objective
of the officer personnel system is to provide a means of
selecting, promoting and separating officers in the most
efficient manner in order to provide at all times a vital
officer corps of sufficient quality and quantity to meet
service needs.
Effective manpower management requires top management
of the organization to have knowledge of or be able to reason-
ably predict changes in the organization and be able to
interpret how those changes will effect the organization. In
particular, if a change in promotion policy is contemplated,
what effect will the policy have on the people below the
promotion point, the number of people remaining in the organ-
ization and the people already promoted to the level of change.
Many questions both analytical and psychological must be
entertained and resolved by personnel managers.
This paper develops deterministic and probabilistic models
which relate attrition rate to promotion rate for senior Naval
Officers. We present data to show that at these ranks officers
leave a rank essentially by promotion or retirement only. The

models we formulate use this fact and hence are not intended
to model the behavior of junior rank officers where attrition
occurs in many ways other than retirement or promotion.
A. OFFICER PERSONNEL
The Navy officer corps is categorized by unrestricted
line, restricted line, staff corps, and limited duty officers.
The unrestricted line category of officers perform the general
tasks of conducting naval warfare, while the restricted line
catagory provides technical guidance in specialized areas of
naval warfare. Staff corps personnel provide support to
naval warfare units in the form of medical services, supply,
legal, and civil and naval engineering facilities. The limited
duty officers are commissioned from the enlisted ranks and
perform the same functions as the unrestricted line officer
but are not eligible to command major naval units.
1. Grade Size
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 [Ref 2] and the
Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 [Ref 3] introduced
constraints on the number of officers authorized within
certain grades. The number of unrestricted line officers with-
in each grade is a function of the total number of unrestricted
line officers on active duty. The constraints for three grades
are:
URL STRENGTH CAPTAIN COMMANDER LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
32,000 6.0% 12.0% 18.0%
40,000 5.8 11.2 17.5
50,000 5.5 10.5 17.3
60,000 5.2 9.8 16.9
70,000 5.0 9.1 16.4
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The above combination of unrestricted line strength
and percentage authorized establishes the "statutory ceiling"
for the above grades.
In addition, the Secretary of the Navy can establish
the strength within a particular grade at a lesser number of
officers than the number derived by the above percentages
and this number becomes the constraint within each grade.
The number within each grade established by the Secretary of
the Navy is often referred to as the "prescribed number"
within each grade.
A similar set of "statutory ceilings" exists for the
restricted line and limited duty officer catagories of officer
personnel. The staff corps have no grade ceilings; instead,
total corps ceilings are established as a percent of the
unrestricted line strength.
2 . Promotions
Promotions in the Navy officer corps are a function
of many things. Two major factors considered in this paper
are:
(a) the number of officers that the Secretary of the
Navy prescribes to be maintained in each grade (usually less
than the "statutory ceilings" and never more)
.
(b) the total commissioned service accured prior to
becoming eligible for promotion.
The prescribed number by grade establishes the
maximum number of officers in that grade. Thus, the number to
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be promoted in a particular grade is a function of the
prescribed number and the vacancies which currently exist in
that grade, i.e., prescribed number less the actual number,
plus the projected vacancies which will occur in the next
twelve months
.
"In order to ensure adequate experience is maintained
within each grade and in the Navy as a whole, and due to
legal constraints of the TITLE 10, U.S. CODE, the promotion
system is based on a minimum number of years in each grade
and hence a minimum total commissioned service prior to
becoming eligible for promotion.
To maintain quality control of personnel, not all
officers eligible for promotion are selected to the next
higher grade. In the grades of Ensign through Lieutenant, those
officers twice failing to be selected to the next higher grade
are separated from the Navy. In the grade of Lieutenant
Commander through Captain, a minimum of 20, 26, and 30 years,
respectively, of active duty is authorized by TITLE 10, U.S.
CODE, without regard to failure of selection to the next higher
grade. Thus, the ranks of Lieutenant Commander through Captain
are guaranteed a statutory retirement.
3. Inputs Into the System
The main source of Regular officers entering the
Navy is the U.S. Naval Academy and Regular NROTC program. How-
ever, in terms of size the largest input into the Naval officer




All officers entering the system via OCS are Reserve officers
with a contractual agreement to remain in the Navy a specific
length of time. Transfer from the Reserve status to Regular
status is controlled by application and selection board
procedure.
Since the total size of the officer corps is
constrained by budgetary considerations, which vary from year
to year, and the inflexibility of instantaneously increasing
the entrants into the system from the Naval Academy and Regular
NROTC, the inputs into the system from the OCS program are
used as a control valve for maintaining the total size of the
officer corps within the required constraints.
4 . System Losses
















release from active duty
reversion to enlisted status (LDO only)
Table I developed by Klingerman [Ref 1] shows the
relative size of attrition losses by rank for the Marine Corps
in a ten year period. It may be noted from Table I that in the
three senior ranks of the Marine Corps more than 70% of those
leaving by other than promotion do so by retirement, while
in the two senior ranks retirements account for more than 94%













COL MAJ CAPT IstLT 2ndLT Total
42 160 3130 7169 18 10,527
360 1571 804 209 56 4,851
2 152 1537 1097 280 3,104
45 111 277 355 324 1,133
1 19 272 133 180 605
16 161 10 187
450 2013 6072 9124 868 20,407
MARINE CORPS OFFICER LOSSES
BY CATAGORY BY RANK
The Discharged catagory in Table I includes discharges
for both disciplinary reasons and disabilities. It is felt
that similar proportions to those in this table would occur
in the Navy, but data was not available to check this.
In the ranks of Ensign through Lieutenant the system
is influenced by many factors external to the system such as
economic conditions and budgetary constraints, in that per-
sonnel can be removed from the system for the convenience of
the government and desires of the individual. In addition,
these ranks are terminal in a two year period if the individual
is not promoted to the next higher rank. In modeling the
ranks of Ensign through Lieutenant these numerous types of
system losses must be taken into account and any analysis must
therefore be complex. Only the ranks of Lieutenant Commander
through Captain will be considered in this paper and from
Table I we shall assume that all losses from these ranks are
by either promotion or retirement.
14

In these models no attempt is made to distinguish
between the four designation catagories of officers or between




If the number of inputs (m)
,
promotions (p) , and retire-
I
ments (m-p) , are considered deterministic and the rank size
(N) is constant then given any two of the parameters (m, p, or
N) the third can be calculated.
Let us assume:
1. Promotions occur simultaneously at the end of year
t (or the start of year t+1)
.
2. All persons not promoted remain in the system the
maximum amount of time allowable until mandatory retirement
at year n.
3. Only losses due to promotions and retirements occur.
4. The rank size is constant over time.




N = number of officers in rank
n = number of years in rank if not promoted
t = number of years in rank if promoted
m = new inputs into the rank per year
p = number promoted to the next higher rank per year
a = the fraction of the total number of people in rank
which are promoted per unit of time (total fractional
promotion rate) (p/N)
4> = fractional loss rate (number of people lost to the
system by other than promotion per unit time per
number of people in rank)
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12 3 t t+1 t+2 n
The total number in grade is:
Years in
rank









(j> = — - a —
n n
1.1
The fractional loss rate is a linear function of the
fractional promotion rate, as shown below:
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aEquation 1.1 implies that the maximum value of the pro-
motion rate is a function of the number of years until promotion,
while the maximum loss rate is proportional to the number of
years until retirement. If the system were such that t = n,
i.e., that promotion and retirement occurred simultaneously,
then the slope of 1.1 will decrease to the point where a
change in the promotion rate will result in an equal change
in the loss rate.
Now consider the same system with retirements permitted
each year at a given number per year, if failure to be promoted
has occurred, i.e., retirements are permitted only from those
not promoted.
Let:
L = number of losses due to retirement per year, from
t + 1 to year n, i.e., the earliest retirement cannot
occur until the start of year t + 1.
Then the total number in rank is:













nN a n * 1 ' 3
Since the system size is constant the total retirement
losses per year (L) cannot be greater than the number of inputs
less losses due to promotion, thus:
[n - (t+1) ]L < m-p
[n - (t+l)]L
N < <j> . 1.4
Thus a lower bound on the loss rate can be established, at
which the promotion rate is:


















The effect of early retirements (L) is to force a lower
bound on the loss rate and an upper bound on the promotion rate
In addition, the upper bound on promotion rate establishes an
upper bound on early retirements (since the promotion rate
cannot be negative) as:
L < N
[n - (t+1)] (n-1)
If early retirements assume the upper bound the promotion
rate decreases to zero and the system degenerates into one in
which all inputs leave only by retirement. As early retirments
approach zero the system returns to the previous model.
Any combination of parameters within the above bounds will
provide a feasible solution in that by specifying any four of




The number of promotions, retirements, and inputs each
year in the actual system are not deterministic but vary from
year to year as changes occur in service policy, economic
conditions, promotion rates, and numerous other factors.
Therefore, the actual number of people leaving or entering
the grade can be characterized as the realization of a random
variable (r.v.) from some probability distribution.
Consider the same assumptions as the deterministic model.
Let:
Mj = new inputs into the rank in year j (r.v.)
P.: = promotions from those eligible in year j (r.v.)
iru = expected value of M.
p.: = expected value of P
.
Assume stationary conditions so the m. = m and p- = p for
all j.
The subscripts on Mj and P-; will be dropped when it is
not necessary to specify any given year j
.
6 = the fraction of the number of people eligible for
promotion (with minimum time in rank) which are
promoted per unit time (year group fractional pro-
motion rate), i.e., expected number of people pro-
moted per expected number of people at the promotion
point.
6 = p/m
Thus the inventory equation is:
j j-t




Taking expectations we have
nm - (n-t)p = N.
Since p = 6m, then
nm - . (n-t) 6m = N,
N
m = n(l-6) + 6t 1 - 7
Equation 1.7 gives the mean of M^ in terms of the promotion
rate. The question arises as to what is the distribution of
Mj for a given promotion policy?
M- is a discrete valued random variable in the range to
N, with the mean given by equation 1.7. One conjecture is that
M.: is binomially distributed with parameters N and
3 J
^~—-^ wu.
n(1 _ 6) + 6t -
However its distribution will probably depend on how promotions
can occur. In the next sections we show that when promotions
can occur only from the number with t years in grade the
binomial conjecture seems to be valid. When P^ is determined in-
dependently, of the distribution of officers in grade, so that
early promotions can occur, then the binomial conjecture
appears to be false.
A. MODEL WITH PROMOTIONS ONLY FROM THOSE WITH t YEARS IN GRADE
Assume that P-, given M.
.
, is binomial with parameters
Mj_t and 6. Then using the following parameter values, the
22







The resulting emperical distribution of inputs appeared
to be binomial. A Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test was conducted
with the emperical distribution and a binomial with parameters
N, and ± . . The hypothesis was accepted at the .95
n(l-6) + 5t ** *
level as shown in Table II. Figure 1 shows the emperical































































CHI SQUARE TEST FOR EMPERICAL DISTRIBUTION OF INPUTS
WHEN PROMOTION OCCURS ONLY AFTER t YEARS IN GRADE





3-4 7 6.79 .31 .09 .00
5 6 14.28 8.28 68.56 4.80
6 25 32.28 7.28 53.00 1.64
7 53 61.73 8.73 76.21 1.23
8 100 102.61 2.61 6.81 .07
9 128 149.75 21.75 473.06 3.16
10 220 194.61 5.39 29.05 .15
11 217 227.56 10.56 110.25 .48
12 255 241.10 13.90 193.21 .80
13 250 233.16 16.84 282.20 1.21
14 239 206.90 32.10 1030.41 4.98
15 173 169.56 3.44 11.83 .07
16 123 128.61 5.61 31.47 .24
17 86 90.88 4.88 23.81 .26
18 56 59.80 3.80 14.40 .24
19 31 36.97 5.97 35.64 .96
20 17 21.43 4.43 19.62 .92
21 9 11.71 2.71 7.31 .62
22 5 5.96 .96 .92 .16
23-24 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41
26.40




B. MODEL WITH PROMOTIONS DETERMINED INDEPENDENT OF GRADE
STRUCTURE
Assume that the number being promoted each year is a
random variable chosen external to the rank being considered.
Since in any given year the number to be promoted may exceed
the number of people at the promotion point, promotion without
sufficient time in grade is permitted. Early promotion is




The resulting emperical distribution of inputs with the
hypothesised binomial distribution superimposed is shown in
Figure 2. The conjecture that inputs are binomially distributed
is clearly invalid in this model.
C. DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS FROM THE
DIFFERENT PROMOTIONS POLICIES
In addition to providing estimates of the distribution of
inputs , the simulation provided insight into the distribution
of retirements and promotions.
Let:
R. = retirements from the rank in year j
3
r • = expected value of R-;
Assume stationary conditions so that r^ = r for all j
.
Retirements in any year are the number of inputs n years






n(l-6) + 6t *
Thus the mean of the retirements distribution can be
estimated analytically.
Since retirement rate (number of retirements per year per














































































a confidence interval for the retirement rate given a promotion
rate can be established. Figure 3 shows the retirement rate
at various promotion rates with a 95% confidence interval.
From the emperical distribution of retirements generated
by the model in which promotions occured only from those with
t years in grade, it appeared that retirements were distributed
Pois son with parameter r equal to 6.25. The hypothesis that
the emperical distribution of retirements were distributed
Poisson (6.25) was tested with a Chi Square Test as shown in
Table III. The hypothesis was accepted at the .95 level.
Figure 4 shows the emperical distribution of retirements with
a Poisson (6.25) distribution superimposed.
TABLE III
CHI SQUARE TEST FOR EMPERICAL DISTRIBUTION OF
RETIREMENTS WHEN PROMOTION OCCURS ONLY AFTER
t YEARS IN GRADE
Number of Observed Expected (0-E) (0-E) 2 (0-E) 2/E
Retirements Frequency Frequency
(0) (E)
1 3.9 2.9 8.41 2.16
1 19 24.1 5.1 26.01 1.08
2 66 75.4 9.4 88.36 1.17
3 141 157.0 16.0 256.00 1.63
4 263 245.3 17.7 313.29 1.28
5 327 306.6 20.4 416.16 1.36
6 309 319.5 10.5 110.25 .35
7 306 285.3 20.7 428.49 1.50
8 235 222.8 12.2 148.84 .67
9 163 154.6 8.4 70.56 .46
10 85 99.6 14.6 213.16 2.14
11 48 54.9 6.9 47.61 .87
12 21 28.6 7.6 57.76 2.02
13 9 13.8 4.8 23.04 1.67
14 5 6.1 1.1 1.21 .20
15-16 2 2.5 .5 .25 .10
Degrees of freedom = 14
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The emperical distribution of retirements generated by
the model in which promotions were generated indpendent of the
grade structure is shown in Figure 5. The emperical distri-
bution of retirements from this model clearly does not support
the conjecture that retirements are Poisson distributed.
However, Figure 5 shows a Geometric distribution with parameter
p = .14 superimposed which, even though not passing a Chi
square test appears to be a good approximation of the emperical
retirements distributions from this model.
Assuming that the system is in steady state and flow in
must equal flow out, the number of promotions per year is equal
to the number of inputs less the number of retirements, or
p = m - r
N N(l-6)
P " n(l-6) + 6t " n(l-6) + fit
N6
p " n(l-6) + 6t * ±m *
Thus, the mean of the unconditional distribution of
promotions can be estimated analytically.
From the emperical distribution of promotions generated by
the model in which promotion is permitted only after t years
in grade, promotions appeared to be distributed Poisson. The
hypothesis that the emperical distribution of promotions was
distributed Poisson with parameter p = 6.25 was tested with a
Chi Square Test as shown in Table IV. The hypothesis was
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rejected at the .95 level however, since the largest contri-
bution to the computed Chi Square value was due to deviations
of the tail of the eraperical from the theoretical distribution,
it was felt the theoretical Poisson was a good approximation
of the emperical distribution.) The emperical distribution of
promotions with a Poisson distribution of parameter 6.25
superimposed is shown in Figure 6.
TABLE IV
CHI SQUARE TEST FOR EMPERICAL DISTRIBUTION OF
PROMOTIONS WHEN PROMOTION OCCURS ONLY AFTER
t YEARS IN GRADE





5 3.9 1.1 1.21 .31
1 18 24.1 6.1 37.21 1.54
2 59 75.4 16.4 268.96 3.57
3 134 157.0 23.0 529.00 3.37
4 246 245.3 .7 .49 .00
5 311 306.6 4.5 319.36 .06
6 339 319.5 19.5 380.25 1.19
7 301 285.3 15.7 246.49 .86
8 253 222.8 30.2 912.04 4.09
9 155 154.6 .4 .16 .00
10 84 99.6 15.6 243.36 2.44
11 58 54.9 3.1 9.61 .18
12 24 28.6 4.6 21.16 .74
13 11 13.8 2.8 7.84 .57
14-18 2 8.6 6.6 43.56 5.07
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The problem we started out to solve was that of developing
deterministic and probabilistic models of the senior Naval
Officer ranks. The deterministic models established a feasible
region for attrition and promotion rates with losses due only
to "mandatory" retirements and with early retirements. The
effect of early retirements was to produce a smaller feasible
region of promotion and attrition rates.
The stochastic models investigated the effect of two
different promotion policies; promotion only from those with
minimum time in grade and a system with early promotion
permitted.
In a personnel system with a fixed time until promotion,
constant grade size and maximum time in the system, the distri-
bution of inputs into the system was binomial. Since, with a
binomial distribution determination of the parameters uniquely
specifies the variance of the distribution, the variance in
inputs can be obtained directly. Likewise, with promotions
and retirements the variance can be obtained by determination
of the distribution parameter.
If it is assumed that the models closely approximate the
actual system the interdependence of the junior and senior
ranks can be established. The next area of investigation would
be to link the ranks together such that inputs into the senior
rank would be promotions from the next junior rank which
in turn, given a retirements distribution, would form an input




In a personnel system in which the time until promotion
is variable, in that promotion prior to minimum time in grade
is permitted, a great deal of variability is introduced into
both the distribution of inputs and retirements.
Although inaccessibility of data prevented direct
verification of the models with the actual system, it is felt
that these models could be used to gain insight into the Naval
officer personnel system for the purpose of determining the
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